Paradox, Poetry, and Eternity: Socrates, Parmenides, and Nietzsche by Austin, Scott
Binghamton University
The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB)
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
12-28-1988
Paradox, Poetry, and Eternity: Socrates, Parmenides,
and Nietzsche
Scott Austin
Texas A&M University
Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp
Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient
Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more
information, please contact ORB@binghamton.edu.
Recommended Citation
Austin, Scott, "Paradox, Poetry, and Eternity: Socrates, Parmenides, and Nietzsche" (1988). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
Newsletter. 256.
https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/256
A-υsit ¡o ??
PARADOX, POETRY, AND ETERNITY: 
SOCRATES, PARMENIDES, AND NIETZSCHE1
Scott Austin 
Texas A&M University 
Wednesday, December 28, 1988 
Washington, D.C.
Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy
Abstractly, some metalanguages and their allied languages are such that the metalinguistic 
truths cannot be put into the language itself without a (fruitful or devastating) paradox which breaks 
the very rules which the metalanguage itself enunciates for the language. Others are such that the 
transposition of metalanguage into language occurs without difficulty. The status of philosophy as 
a purported "science of all sciences" from classical times to the present hangs on this difference; for, 
unless there can be speech about speech in one’s own (however elaborated) natural language, the 
metaphysical enterprise sooner or later topples, to be replaced by faith, poetry, or sociology, to name 
only a few (not inferior, but non-ontological) examples.
But this is too abstract, and moreover represents a conclusion, not an introduction. I shall 
here be concerned with one example of each type of metalanguage-language relationship, with 
examples taken from the ancient world: Parmenides and Socrates, as I think each can be read, and 
as I have attempted to read them before.2 I shall then add detail and documentation in the case of 
Socrates, and attempt to reflect in a new way on what emerges from the juxtaposition of these two 
figures for philosophy of first principles, for the concerns I have raised in the first paragraph above.
The dominant contemporary view on Parmenides* discovery of reason really dates from Plato’s 
Sophist. It is best found now in the writings of Owen, Furth, Nussbaum, and MacKenzie.3 The idea 
is that Parmenides was an absolute monist who argued for his view by shunning what is not (whatever 
that is) and who therefore embroiled himself in all sorts of necessary paradoxes of self-referential 
inconsistency, knowing full well that this was what he was doing and intending the resulting 
paradoxes as pedagogical tools. They make one understand the doctrine and thus why they are 
unnecessary. To put the account of the view crudely: if a thing comes to be or perishes or changes, 
then it is not what it was or will be (the dreaded "is not"); if it has gaps or inhomogeneities, it is not 
in one place as it is in another; finally, if there are two things, each is not the other. Thus 
Parmenidean being must be, as his goddess says in Fragment 8 of the poem, "ungenerable . . . 
unperishing . . .  a whole of a single kind, unmoving and perfect." It has to be conceded to this view 
that it has explanatory adequacy, as it does account for the transcendental predicates that are claimed 
and proven of being.
The trouble is, it explains too much. Parmenides is not just an absolute monist, on my view 
as on theirs; he is one with a particular twist. It’s not just that (again, in spite of Plato’s Sophist) 
Parmenideans have trouble explaining how appearance can be different from reality if all is one, nor 
just that numerically different words supposedly expressive of truths about being cannot exist if all 
is one, nor even how the single word "being" could denote the thing being if there is no difference; 
in these senses, absolute monism could perhaps best be communicated as in Zen monasteries with a 
shrug of the shoulders,4 and pedagogically undertaken self-referential inconsistency is unavoidable. 
1 do not see how to clear Parmenides of these charges--if they are charges--indeed, students like to 
point out to me that he winds up in the same boat as Cratylus the Heraclitean, who, convinced that 
the world was so changeable that language could not fix it, settled for raising a single finger in silence 
as his ultimate expressive device.
It is instead with other accusations of self-referential inconsistency that I am preoccupied. 
I hoped to clear Parmenides of these and in so doing to establish the difference from Socrates that 
I mentioned earlier. The fact is that if you read Parmenides’ poem you will find the goddess many 
times using the very "it is not" that she herself had apparently prohibited, in vocabulary 
("ungenerable”). in syntax ("nor is it divisible"), and in proof, by denying the opposite of what she
* * * *
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wants to prove. Indeed, she negates more often than she asserts. And this apparent inconsistency 
seems peculiar to Parmenides, not just one allied to absolute monism in general. For the view \ am 
criticizing, it is just one more inconsistency, a way for her to get us to see her views by getting us 
to see that she cannot speak without flouting them.
But without rerehearsing too much a case I have made elsewhere, let me please just say that 
I found this interpretation not simple-minded enough. The goddess surrounds her speech with 
metaphors of persuasion, trust, necessity, and unshakability, and even signals to us explicitly, when 
she later begins to treat human views instead of true views, that her words are then to be taken as 
deceptive; but there is no such signal in her account of being, which reads simply like literal 
transcendental argument. I have suggested a hypothesis which would, I believe, allow us to take her 
at face value without dispensing with the unavoidable monistic paradoxes, one which would have 
her show us what to do and how to think by not having her break her own negation-rules before we 
are all mystically united with being. Indeed, I think, the latter is not possible without the former; 
for a speech all of whose words undercut themselves in a patternless way is indistinguishable from 
silence. The idea is that if it is not necessary to take the self-referential inconsistencies as owing to 
negation, then the hypothesis that the negative words are literally meant is at least possible.
If you will take my word for it, sentences of the following types do or could occur in the 
poem’s proof
Si s P  
S is not-P 
not-S is P 
(not-S is not-P)
together with some negations of sentences as a whole. But sentences of the following type do not:
S is-not P (S isn’t P)
S is-not not P (S isn’t not-P) 
not-S is-not P (not-S isn’t P) 
not-S is-not not-P (not-S isn’t not-P)
The only Greek expression which is unambiguously reducible to the "isn’t" in the sentences which do 
not occur is ouk esti, "is-not"--and yet this is the very expression which is prohibited by the goddess 
when she makes the prohibitions which base the subsequent proofs. Thus what is prohibited—i.e. 
a negated copula—never occurs except modally or as prohibited, etc., as a sequence of words, though 
most every other conceivable kind of subject--or predicate—negation does occur. To me the message 
seems to be that the language was intended to be positive, that other kinds of negation besides that 
of the copula can and do occur, and that copula-negation was prohibited because it was thought to 
rob the sentence of meaning, i.e. possible function as a judgement connecting subject and predicate. 
Thus the proofs themselves, I think, need not be self-referentially inconsistent at least because of 
their negations, and the language can be literal transcendental argument which does not need to 
undercut itself in order to make its point. This is the hypothesis.
I am, then, claiming that Parmenides on one level is a master of bold-faced speech, not of 
paradoxes. I shall say precisely the opposite of Socrates, and here it is surprising that major views 
try to give a literal, non-paradoxical reading of a major issue in Socrates’ life: how does he whose 
wisdom consists in ignorance, know that he does not know? Thus the views of Socrates taken by 
others and by myself will be opposites, though in opposite ways.
Socrates’ friend Chaerephon consulted the oracle and found out that no one was wiser than 
Socrates. The statement is interestingly ambiguous; either Socrates is on a pinnacle above the rest of 
us, or we are all on the same level. I shall suggest that both are true. The story is from the Apology. 
Socrates, sure of his own lack of wisdom yet unwilling to believe Apollo capable of a lie, conducts 
a series of interviews with politicians, poets, and craftspeople. Either he will find out that they really
3are as wise as they are supposed to be (and thus a fortiori wiser than he), or he will trip them up. 
(The word "wise" here could initially cover success in any of these human domains.) What he finds 
is that, though undeniably successful, the politicians and poets cannot give an account of themselves, 
and the craftspeople, though wise in the technical sense, are lost on the level of theory. It is not so 
much what any of these people are doing that is objectionable to Socrates; it is that they will accept 
the title of "wise" without what he regards as its precondition—some sort of rational justification. 
Of course, he does not have one either, and thus is strictly on their level—the first half of the oracle’s 
ambiguity. Yet he has discernment somehow about this fact about himself and about others; knowing 
that he lacks a justification, he knows that he does not know, and thus is better off than all his 
interlocutors, who all think they know even though they really don’t. And this is the second possible 
reading of the ambiguous oracle. I would suggest, though Apollo did not say so, (Apollo rarely says 
what he means), that Socrates’ ignorance makes him no less ignorant than the rest of us, but that his 
knowledge of that ignorance is meant to make him wiser, thus both sides of the ambiguity come to 
the same thing. Note how limited the scope of the wisdom is; it consists only in a reflection 
performed on a lower-order lack of wisdom, and results only in a hypothetical conclusion: if I am 
wise, it can only be because I know that I am not. The god’s wisdom, speaking df course from a 
higher plane, knows that only those humans who know that they are only human are worthy to 
perform the civic role of questioners, gadflies, and eventual victims of judicial murder.
I have said that Socrates somehow has "discernment" or "knowledge" of his own ignorance, and 
that this enables him to agree with the God’s ambiguous assessment of him as a mortal who transcends 
his own mortality through the very act of knowing it. Since I also earlier claimed that other 
interpreters try to remove the sting of the paradox while I would like to intensify it, let me go on in 
an attempt to argue.
I have relied so far on the Apology in making the claim that Socrates’ ignorance is not a mere 
toying with metalanguages but is crucial to how he thinks about how he is supposed to behave. 
Indeed, in the Lysis, Laches, and CAarw/i/cs—traditionally early dialogues in part because they end 
also in confessions of ignorance—it is clear what the results are in terms of pedagogical strategy, and 
it is thus unnecessary to try to document further the centrality of these statements for him. The 
question is: is the paradox a paradox at all? is it defusible?
In an effort to shrink the wide spectrum of opinions on the subject I would like to deal simply 
with the more literalistic views of Gregory Vlastos and a conventionalism I find an interesting 
challenge. Once again, my goal is to attribute to Socrates just the opposite of what I attributed to 
Parmenides, and I hope that the significance of this will appear fully later.5
Thrasymachus says in Republic, Book I, that Socrates is lying and feigning ignorance in order 
to trap people. While, in my opinion, there is certainly an element of strategy in the claim not to 
know (what better way to expose tenderest beliefs for manipulation) it must be at least ironically 
sincere (in the modern sense, in which even irony can tell the truth) if reflection on it is to have 
started Socrates on a career ending in the failure of personal relationships and execution after a show 
trial. Quite apart from what he says in the Apology, a cocktail-party parasite would have begged off 
as soon as his or her own gratification or welfare were in question. Nor, I think, could it have been 
a matter of simple belief or right opinion, this stance towards his own ignorance, and that for the 
same reason; not only are we told that he concluded what he did because of an imperative emanating 
from the oracle, but the entire Socratic elenchus is directed toward the examination of opinions; an 
opinion about his own ignorance and concomitant course of life would never have been allowed to 
star.i unprobed. It could be that he is making a mistake, but he will always give you his reasons.
If we dismiss lies and true or false opinions, one path will suggest conventions and Vlastos 
will suggest knowledge—but a nonparadoxical kind of knowledge.
Could it be that Socrates is a cultured citizen of Athens who takes beliefs common to all 
cultured and no-so-cultured interlocutors and simply follows their lead, inevitably winding up in 
cohtrâdietion, in the conviction of ignorance both for himself and his hearers? Here we would not
4have just belief, of course, but reason operating on belief; but all of us have been in the sad 
condition of realizing that our hopefully crystalline theoretical formulations were not matched in 
cogency by our practical maxims or by each other. This is a conventionalist view as I understand it.
The difficulty is: how does one know that the beliefs are in conflict? One cannot just believe 
it, for the reasons I have explained. One cannot know it without having some grounding for the 
rules of reason on the basis of which one conducts one’s arguments. How does one know that a belief 
needs a justification? That an elicited contradiction dooms an assertion? That a definition is not a 
set of examples? That reductio ad absurdum argument works? That rational agreement through 
dialectic is a good social goal? How does one know the truth of the arts of negation, subordination, 
and syllogism? Only, I think, the avoidance of contradiction could be said to be a culturally 
cultivated practice; the other things I have mentioned are things that Socrates repeatedly has to drum 
into his interlocutors as if they had never encountered them before. Surely Socrates practiced a new 
kind of reason, not hitherto encountered, at the expense of all, including himself, not reducible to 
the norms and customs of cultivated conversation, if his criticism was that people did not know 
what they believed, then he must have known at least those argumentative techniques and 
presuppositions that he himself used.
But this makes the problem deeper. How could he have known these things when he said he 
did not know, in fact used them to expose ignorance? Here Vlastos, by distinguishing between two 
kinds of knowledge, attempts to cut through the paradox. The knowledge that Socrates is allowed 
to have is called "elenctic knowledge"; the other,which Socrates denies to himself, is called "certain 
knowledge." Elenctic knowledge emerges only from one-on-one conversations with interlocutors, 
and has to do with the mutual consistency of the beliefs that they specifically hold as expressions of 
life-style. Thus Vlastos’ model, if I understand it properly and may extend it, is that if you can show 
someone that three of their beliefs are incompatible with a fourth, which they also believe, then 
either the fourth is doomed or further investigation into the ranking and logical interrelationships 
of the three needs to be performed. Then, if many conversations with many interlocutors lead 
Socrates for example to the conclusion that everybody’s real beliefs are surprisingly incompatible with 
the idea that it is better to do wrong with impunity than to suffer it, Socrates will claim that he 
"knows" that an innocent victim of tyranny is better off than a tyrant. And yet this "knowledge," 
based as it is only on repetition and on the consistency of beliefs furnished by others, is not a priori 
or certain like Plato’s claimed knowledge of the good; it is, says Vlastos, just "elenctic." And this is 
supposed to dissolve the paradox of Socratic ignorance that I am considering now, since no amount 
of elenctic expertise could grant me certain knowledge of my own ignorance. The best Icould have 
would be a series of tape-recordings of conversations in which I and my friends were unable to 
define anything. Thus there is no paradox, since the elenctic knowledge I have of my own ignorance 
is not the certain knowledge I lack when I have that ignorance. If all I have to go on are beliefs and 
their incompatibilities, it might be claimed,then even the belief that I do not know is potentially 
subject to conversational revision, as long as the Athenian officers of justice permit. And I am sure 
Vlastos would argue that this is just what Socrates does when he queries politicians, poets, and 
craftspeople, and finds out that they do not know; the lack of certain knowledge is partly a function 
of the belief-oriented situation, but also a generalization from the actual conversations that Socrates 
did have with all and sundry.
Against this I bring up two points. First, nowhere is it shown how Socrates elenctically knows 
the principles of logic, deduction, incompatibility, argument, and dialectic, if these are supposedly 
basic to any elenctic conclusion. Indeed, these cannot be elenctically known, but must be known with 
certainty, if the elenchus is to proceed. This is the point I made against the conventionalist view. 
Thus Socrates must have certain knowledge if he is to know his own ignorance. Otherwise the 
elenchus is a mere fugue of ideas with no criteria for argumentative adequacy—which it clearly was 
not.
Second, if Vlastos’ view is to work Socrates must know the difference between the knowledge 
he has and the knowledge he lacks. Isn’t this philosophical knowledge of the most refined sort? Can 
one Sustain a distinction between the probable and the certain without having criteria for what is
5certain? From whence were these criteria derived if not from a theoretical epistemology? Even a 
lifetime of experience with elenctic argument would not entitle me to say that my elenctic knowledge 
fell short of something unless I had a pretty clear idea of what that something was. Indeed, even 
within the elenchus, how do I distinguish between a certain definition and an uncertain one—the 
former known to be never achieved—without known metaelenctic criteria for definition and 
unshakable truth? Once again, Socrates could not have known his own ignorance without having 
certain knowledge of a fairly high theoretical sort.
Thus I take it that Socrates’ attitude towards his own ignorance was not that of a lie, nor a 
false or true belief only, nor a conclusion from conventional presuppositions, nor the outcome of 
elenchus only. Instead, we must suppose that he knew, for good reason and with full theoretical 
certainty, that he did not know even what he knew.
But this, of course, might seem to make the paradox intolerable. For now the principles of 
logic and epistemology governing his arguments and guiding his searches are such that, once known, 
they show why it is impossible to know even themselves. And this is just the interpretation of 
Parmenides I have argued against. Does it make sense to attribute such a situation to Socrates, the 
inventor of the ideal of rational clarity in definition with the good life as the end in view?
I think it does. I shall use religious terminology in what follows, but I do not intend an 
irrationalist interpretation. Indeed, I hope to show in my conclusion how Socrates and Parmenides 
represent two solutions to a fundamental problem within reason.
What makes Socrates human, just like the rest of us, is that he does not know. What makes 
him wiser than we, he concludes, is that he knows better than we do that he does not know. That 
is his interpretation of the oracle. His divine commission is that, knowing that he does not know, 
he can go about infecting the rest of us with his own ignorance. It is thus his uniqueness and his 
divine commission which are closely allied to his knowing that he does not know, and thus to the 
self-refuting principles on which that knowledge is based.
It follows, I think that the principles themselves are divine, and that Socrates has access to 
the divine as he reasons according to them. But he is hot allowed to gain anything from them except 
negative conclusions, just as his Daimonion or divine sign always signals to him "no" and never "yes." 
Thus he is not a god, and cannot define beauty or virtue in the early dialogues. More than that, in 
convicting him of ignorance, the divine again and again convicts him of ignorance even of itself, and 
bumps his sloping satyr-like forehead against the dust of our common humanity as it wipes out 
knowledge of the very principles on which the conviction of ignorance was based. The result in the 
early dialogues is thus not only that the hoped-for definition is stymied, but that doubt is cast on the 
very ratiopality which overthrew each definition in turn:
If neither those who love nor are loved, neither the like nor the unlike, nor the good, 
nor those who belong to us, nor any other of all of the suppositions which we passed 
in review . . .  If, I say, not one of them is the object of friendship, I no longer know 
what I am to say."6
Yet for all that Socrates picks himself up off the ground again, convinced of his humanity yet always 
striving to transcend it, knowing yet not-knowing, supplied with divine criteria yet without the 
means to attain them, avoiding relativism and scepticism by his refusal to give up, avoiding platonism 
by his refusal to claim even one shred of a paradoxical certain knowledge that is not properly his 
own. Such, at any rate, would be a reading which refused to weaken the paradox of Socratic 
ignorance and which then went on to see a connection between the divine mission ahd the part of 
Socrates which knows that he does not know. And this is not an unrecognizable Socrates: the 
Charmides who acquires more temperance by acknowledging that he does not know what temperance 
is, the trio—Socrates, Lysis, and Menexenus--who, in spite of differences in age, become friends in 
part by acknowledging their ignorance of friendship—all are examples of the creative moral use of 
ignorance, the use of principles of reason whose human significance lies in part in their biting their
6own tails. The divine significance of self-referential inconsistency is an old story in negative and 
redemptive theology. What I have tried to do is to see the same phenomenon at work here, to see 
underneath Socrates’ silenus mask to the golden statues of wisdom within, as poor Alcibiades puts it 
in the Symposium.
Some examples may be useful here. The Lysis* ultimate ignorance of friendship is, of course, 
based on poetic and other maxims, scientific theories, teleology, psychology, not to mention various 
ordinary principles of reasoning or—in general—acts of reasoning assented to by an interlocutor in 
order to reach conclusions which destroy themselves, are mutually contradictory, are replaced by 
fresh hypotheses and terminate in a final aporia. This aporta thus comes about not just because of 
the hypotheses which ruled each other out but because all appeared supported by one or another 
knowledge—claim.
To be more specific: the following are major principles and specimens of inference which 
leap out even from casual perusal of the Lysis in English. I shall show below how they function in 
the argument. The criterion for the selection, which is not intended to be exhaustive, is that what 
is selected be used or deferred to as a basis for subsequent arguments, yet itself not be argued for
friends share and share alike
to love is to want to make someone as happy as possible 
■210D empirical examples of how one has liberty and is useful 
in matters about which one is knowledgeable 
D the useless can have no friends and are unlovable 
animals cannot love in return
you can be a friend to your children when punishing them even if they hate you at 
the time
the bad are too variable to be friends
the good qua good are self-sufficient
friendship is not a friend to enmity or vice versa
the beautiful is friendly
desire is for that of which one is in want
that of which one is in want is that which has been taken from one
antecedently.7
(1) 207C
(2) 207D
(3) 208A-
(4)
(5) 210C-
(6) 212E
(7) 213
(8) 214D
(9) 215A
GO) 216B
(M) 216A
(12) 22 ID
(13) 221E
I call these "examples": (3)-(4), (6), (7); and these "rules and generalizations": (1), (2), (5), (8), (9), 
(10), (11), (12), (13).
(2)-(5) are the core of Socrates’ protreptic with Lysis; (6) and (7) are involved in major alternatives 
in Socrates’ consideration with Menexenus of loving and being loved; (8) and (9) by themselves defeat 
the entire consideration of friendship among the bad and among the good, respectively; (10) defeats 
the claim that friendship is between opposites; (12) and (13), by leading to the absurd claim that all 
desire is reciprocated, defeat the possibility that love might be desire.
Thus we have statements with no preceding argument, agreed upon by Socrates and his 
interlocutor, most crucial to the refutations and thus to the aporia. Please note that I am not levying 
the charge that Socratic dialectic rests on unfounded premises. I am instead attempting to make the 
point that refutations in the dialogue’s complex aporia often depend on treating something as known 
—i.e. that this ignorance depends on knowledge as manifested by joint assent to a rule or to the 
interpretation and significance of a counterexample, That is, the final aporia depends on each 
preceding refutations’ having been successful, and thus on the principles I have just listed. Thus 
ignorance here rests on knowledge, so far as I can see.
What is at issue are two models of Greek reason: a direct, descriptive, canonically
methodological one based on transcendental argument, versus a kind of reasons which works 
pëdago'gically or morally through a kind of language which violates its own principles and thus 
Üñderctits itself. What is even more at issue is a problem in the foundations of reason. If as a lover
7of philosophy one is interested in the question of how to justify first principles, then these are two 
among many other models for making or for abandoning the attempt. The question is: given some 
principles and what one might call a sphere of discourse governed by those principles—a 
metalanguage and a language—can the principles be expressed literally in the sphere of discourse 
which they govern or does the mere attempt to do so generate paradoxes because speech within the 
sphere can be only presuppose the principles, not express them? Under many circumstances I 
suppose the answer could fall either way, but—if there are any such universal principles without 
infinite regress—it is at least harder to give an answer in the case of first principles, since, if there 
is no discourse for them which is in either way accessible, then both Greek models will fall.
Let me consider some modern models. One claim in Nietzsche’s Genealogy o f Morals seems 
to be that the Christian theologically- and morally-based conscience eventually turns against itself 
in that its criteria for truth, when made stricter and stricter, eventually make one deny that very 
belief in god as truth on which such a conscience was originally based. I am not concerned now with 
the truth or falsity of Nietzsche’s claim, but only on its structure and paradox. God inspires criteria 
which turn against god--but that is only the first paradox, and it by no means leads to atheism by 
itself alone. The second paradox is that, without god in the first place, there would have been no 
criteria to use against god. Well then? Nietzsche leaves the solution of this paradox to readers. But 
if one understands that all non-relativistic notions of truth are bound up for him with the notion of 
god, the results will not be an absolutistic atheism so much as the demonstration that absolutism is 
self-undercutting in a way that leads inevitably to relativism. Not relativism as a separate, opposed 
position, but relativism as emerging paradox within absolutism. And here the historical irony is 
evident to readers of the Theaetetus, where relativism and its paradoxes (e.g. is relativism relative 
only to relativists?) are argued against from an absolutistic standpoint in the quest for knowledge. 
All these, I would think, are attempts to demonstrate that canons for truth cannot be formulated in 
the sphere of the language they govern without inevitably undercutting themselves. The only 
statements possible are "this is my norm," or "there are our norms," without any attempt to give 
Parmenidean reasons, or even Socratic ones. And Nietzsche then goes on to see such norms as canons 
of the creative will, rejoicing in the absence of reasons.
For the latter Wittgenstein, too, certain conventional philosophical problems are expressions 
of failures to understand the difference between statements made within languages and statements 
made about the social behavior underlying languages. This is the same problem, only with an attempt 
to keep paradoxes away, to preserve the distinction between language and metalanguage. 
(Unfortunately the question of the status of statements made about social behavior itself is not 
sufficiently addressed. "This is the way we do it" does not solve a metaphysical problem, and one 
senses unexamined Nietzschian paradoxes in the background.) Moreover, in the face of the sustained 
Nietzschian critique of Parmenidean truth, it is not enough to say that we need it in order to solve 
ethical problems or problems of social justice (for there is no reason why such problems should be 
soluble); nor is it enough to give a reductionistic explanation of any sort, since the bottom level of 
the pyramid of reduction must be describable as if true à la Parmenides even if the top level is 
Parmenides himself disguised as some ideology or other. Nor—certainly--will it do to resurrect the 
past.
Plato in the Timaeus posed his challenge to all subsequent philosophy thus: i f  there is a 
distinction between true opinion and knowledge, then there must be a distinction between platonic 
forms and particulars, each mode of cognition corresponding to an appropriate object. Aristotle 
disagreed, thinking that one could have the one without the other. My version is not too far off: 
either stable Parmenidean reason or the self-undercutting, relative modes found in different ways 
in Socrates or (at the end of our tradition) Nietzsche. Of course there are many compromises. But 
it could be maintained that our historical position is indeed a fortunate one; for the corrosive of 
Nietzsche, it could be maintained, eats through much of our current thought, while the whole 
dichotomy is now historically accessible to us at both its extremes.
Yet one cannot help but be uncomfortable, and to wonder what lies ahead. The 
imperturbable silence of absolute monism versus the din of relativism, which speaks in many
8tongues? Plato’s compromise was programmatically designed to fit in between just these alternatives. 
And yet, as I have perhaps indicated, I am somewhat suspicious of bold Platonic definitions 
undertaken where even Socrates withheld his hand out of sheer humility.
What I think is common to both extremes is a certain insistence on eternity, allied with a kind 
of poetry. Here I do not mean poetry in the fashionable twentieth-century sense, in which one 
laments the past in language nobody can understand, makes a fetish of one’s own act of creation, 
bewails one’s inability to write, calls literary criticism poetry, or comments in verse on a tradition 
which is rendered dead as if it had ever been only a text in the first place. I mean poetry in the 
visionary sense, as proclaiming the sight of the eternal in the temporal. Homer and Parmenides wrote 
songs; Plato wrote plays.
But why should eternity be a workable notion after Nietzsche? Parmenides’ goddess registers 
being in the "now" of eternity; Platonic time is a moving image of eternity; but all Nietzsche offers 
us—and that in a prophetic mode—is the eternal recurrence, a temporalized eternity. And yet, 
paradoxically, the result could be viewed as even stronger than the classical version. It is numerically 
the same event which recurs endlessly in Nietzsche, since all principles of individuation between 
events (including clocks) also recur and are thus indistinguishable from their recurrences. Thus the 
cosmos as a whole displays itself across time—or rather, defines a delimited chunk of time—and yet 
is at the same time a frozen moment which does not itself traverse time, there being in reality only 
one recurrence with no time outside it. And this frozen moment—whatever its inside structure may 
be—is eternal in the same way as Parmenides’ eternal sphere. Thus eternity as an expression of 
hermeneutical cycles at the end of the tradition parallels eternity as an expression of literal 
transcendental argument at the beginning. The notion itself survives and is the common denominator 
between Nietzsche and his antithesis. Nor is this residual traditionalism in Nietzsche, or a Nietzsche 
who temporarily burst free in Zarathustra from his aphoristic, nihilistic side; it is rather that linear 
temporality without a recurrence would be for him an expression of classical truth, something that 
would make it impossible for me to sanctify my own relativistic deeds and values by willing them 
myself in perpetuity rather than submitting them to someone else’s demarcated scheme. Thus, he 
would say, a mere twentieth-century temporalization or reduction of values would repress the instinct 
of creation that sets values free. Both the Eleatic tradition and its opposite, then, are committed to 
a perpetual sabbath of the "now." And this is where we have to start.
Now, I am not going to pretend that Parmenidean eternity incorporates the temporal in the 
same way that Nietzsche’s does. For Parmenides the temporal is a strict bastardization, yet even he 
is constrained by hermeneutics, if by nothing else, to pose his vision as a young man’s chariot-ride 
to the edge of the earth, his penetration through the grinding axioms of justice and warm reception 
by a goddess, his steerage, like Telemachus in the Odyssey, along the proper route to the homeland 
of truth, and truth’s own bondage to the fixity in chains of justice, necessity, and doom—all poetry 
whose literary antecedents have been speculated about since antiquity, and just as wild in its 
occupation of literary mountain-tops as parts of Zarathustra. In the end for Parmenides this is to 
dissolve into the mystical vision of a "ring of endless light"; but the poetry contains that eternal goal 
of the fantastic voyage from the beginning. And it is not necessary to speak of Nietzsche’s poetry, 
or of Blake, Milton, or Dante, as finding in things and human feelings not only images of things 
above but also the clear presence of their archetypes in things below, a compresence of eternity in 
time which is seen and then recorded or prophetically spoken.
This is not to saÿ that visionary poetry is the ultimate fulfillment of the philosophical quest. 
But it is an appropriate accompaniment of our tradition both at its beginning and at its end, in the 
light of the notion of eternity, however conceived.
I am well aware that a call for a philosophical future in which eternity couples with poetry 
may seem insufficiently clear. But I would hope at least to have reflected on certain 
metaphilosophical considerations, to have shown that these generate at least two types of 
philosophical speech, to have situated these within the tradition, especially at the beginning and at 
the end, to have provided historical and documentary reasons for situating them so, particularly
9arguments about Socrates. I will suggest in a moment that both types of speech can converge, but 
I will have for the moment to leave solution, elaboration and criticism to better heads than mine.
Nietzsche suggests that a dionysian drunkard, fresh from an orgy of libido and raw animal 
meat, might pass out under a tree and, in a dream, conceive the golden vision of Apollo. If so, 
rational clarity is only the inverse image of our animal sap, the jugular instincts we attempt in vain 
to hold in behind the prison walls of consciousness until we overflow. The traditional version of 
philosophy, on the other hand, views Socrates as a hero because no amount of wine diminishes his 
dialectical clarity or resistance to sexual temptation. If these versions are compatible, it can only be 
because both are necessary. And this would be William Blake’s
To see a World in a Grain of Sand
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower.8
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